METRO-GOLDWYN-MAYER, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, v. AMERICAN
HONDA MOTOR CO., INC., et al., Defendants.
CV 94-8732-KN (Mcx)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF
CALIFORNIA
900 F. Supp. 1287; 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19169
March 29, 1995, DATED
March 31, 1995, ENTERED, DOCKETED; March 29, 1995, FILED
ORDER RE: (1) MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; (2) MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Based on the papers submitted and the brief arguments presented at the March
13, 1995 hearing, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary
injunction and DENIES Defendants' motion for summary judgment for the reasons
set forth below. n1 Plaintiffs [*1291] are ORDERED to post a bond in the
amount of $ 6,000,000 for this preliminary injunction to issue.
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n1 During a February 10, 1995 telephone conference with counsel, the Court
proposed that the parties proceed to an expedited trial on the merits in lieu of
proceeding on Plaintiffs' preliminary injunction motion. Plaintiffs were
receptive to the idea, but Defendants suggested instead that they be allowed to
file a motion for summary judgment, and that the Court issue a ruling on both
Plaintiffs' and Defendants' motions simultaneously. The Court agreed to this
procedure and calendared these two motions for March 13, 1995.
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The Court ORDERS that Defendants, their agents, employees, representatives,
and all others purporting to work, or working, on their behalf, be, and by this
order are, enjoined from continuing to infringe on Plaintiffs' copyrighted works
by displaying or exhibiting in any manner, or causing to be displayed or
exhibited in any manner, the Honda del Sol commercial which is the subject of
this action, in any medium, including network or cable television or movie
theaters.
I. Introduction
This case arises out of Plaintiffs Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer's and Danjaq's claim
that Defendants American Honda Motor Co. and its advertising agency Rubin
Postaer and Associates, violated Plaintiffs' "copyrights to sixteen James Bond
films and the exclusive intellectual property rights to the James Bond character
and the James Bond films" through Defendants' recent commercial for its Honda
del Sol automobile. Plaintiffs' Opening Memo re: Preliminary Injunction Motion,
at 3.
Premiering last October 1994, Defendants' "Escape" commercial features a
young, well-dressed couple in a Honda del Sol being chased by a high-tech
helicopter. A grotesque villain with metal-encased arms n2 jumps out [**3] of
the helicopter onto the car's roof, threatening harm. With a flirtatious turn to
his companion, the male driver deftly releases the Honda's detachable roof
(which Defendants claim is the main feature allegedly highlighted by the
commercial), sending the villain into space and effecting the couple's speedy
get-away.
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n2 Defense counsel argued at the hearing that the villain's arms were normal
and merely gloved. The Court's review of the commercial indicates that at the
very least, the gloves contained some sort of metal in them as indicated by the
scraping and clanging sounds made by the villain as he tries to get into, and
hold onto, the Honda's roof.
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Plaintiffs move to enjoin Defendants' commercial pending a final trial on the
merits, and Defendants move for summary judgment.
II. Factual Background
In 1992, Honda's advertising agency Rubin Postaer came up with a new concept
to sell the Honda del Sol convertible with its detachable rooftop. For what was
to become the commercial at issue, Rubin [**4] Postaer vice-president Gary
Yoshida claims that he was initially inspired by the climax scene in "Aliens,"
wherein the alien is ejected from a spaceship still clinging onto the spacecraft
's door. From there, Yoshida and coworker Robert Coburn began working on the
storyboards for the "Escape" commercial. As the concept evolved into the
helicopter chase scene, it acquired various project names, one of which was
"James Bob," which Yoshida understood to be a play on words for James Bond.
Yoshida Depo. at 45. In addition, David Spyra, Honda's National Advertising
Manager, testified the same way, gingerly agreeing that he understood "James Bob
to be a pun on the name James Bond." Spyra Depo. at 91.
While the commercial was initially approved by Honda in May 1992, it was put
on hold because of financing difficulties. Actual production for the commercial
did not begin until after July 8, 1994, when Honda reapproved the concept.
Defendants claim that, after the initial May 1992 approval, they abandoned the
"James Bob" concept, whiting out "James" from the title on the commercial's
storyboards because of the implied reference to "James Bond." However,
Plaintiffs dispute this assertion, [**5] pointing to the fact that when
casting began on the project in the summer of 1994, the casting director
specifically sent requests to talent agencies for "James Bond"-type actors and
actresses to star in what conceptually could be "the [*1292] next James Bond
film." n3
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n3 Defendants respond that this decision was solely the casting director's,
and that the director was actually instructed to look for "The Avengers"-type
actors. This assertion is belied by the fact that: (1) even if this is true,
Defendant Rubin Postaer must have had knowledge about this because they were in
charge of the overall project; (2) Plaintiffs' "Avengers" experts, Brian Clemens
and David Rogers, state in their declarations that the Honda characters bear no
resemblance to the "Avengers" but closely mimic "James Bond"; and (3) during his
deposition, Yoshida kept on referring to the Honda protagonist as "James," which
suggests that Rubin Postaer never really abandoned the concept.
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With the assistance of the same special effects team that worked [**6] on
Arnold Schwarzenegger's "True Lies," Defendants proceeded to create a sixty- and
thirty-second version of the Honda del Sol commercial at issue: a fast-paced
helicopter chase scene featuring a suave hero and an attractive heroine, as well
as a menacing and grotesque villain.
The commercial first aired on October 24, 1994, but was apparently still not
cleared for major network airing as late as December 21, 1994. Plaintiffs first
viewed the film during the weekend of December 17 and 18, 1994; they demanded
that Defendants pull the commercial off the air on December 22; Defendants
refused on December 23; and Plaintiffs filed this action on December 30, 1994.
After a brief telephone conference with this Court on January 4, 1995, the Court
allowed Plaintiffs to conduct expedited discovery in this matter.
On January 15, 1995, in an effort to accommodate Plaintiffs' demands without
purportedly conceding liability, Defendants changed their commercial by: (1)
altering the protagonists' accents from British to American; and (2) by changing
the music to make it less like the horn-driven James Bond theme. This version of
the commercial was shown during the Superbowl, allegedly the most widely [**7]
viewed TV event of the year.
Plaintiffs filed the instant motion for preliminary injunction on January 23,
1995, and Defendants filed their summary judgment motion on February 21, 1995.
III. Legal Analysis
A. Plaintiffs' Preliminary Injunction Motion
1. The Preliminary Injunction Standard
In the Ninth Circuit, "[a] preliminary injunction may be granted if the
moving party shows either (1) a combination of probable success on the merits
and the possibility of irreparable harm, or (2) the existence of serious
questions going to the merits, the balance of hardships tipping sharply in its
favor, and at least a fair chance of success on the merits." Senate of State of
California v. Mosbacher, 968 F.2d 974, 977 (9th Cir. 1992). In essence, this
test requires looking at two key elements in deciding whether an injunction
should issue: the relative merits of the claim, and the relative harms to be
suffered by the parties.
2. Merits Of Plaintiff's Copyright Infringement Claim
The required showing of likelihood of success on the merits is examined in
the context of injuries to the parties and the public, and is not reducible to a
mathematical formula. [**8] See, e.g., Dataphase Systems, Inc. v. C L Systems,
Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir. 1981) (rejecting idea that "likelihood"
requires moving party to show better than 50-50 chance of prevailing on merits).
To satisfy the "merits" prong of the preliminary injunction standard, Plaintiffs
must show a "reasonable probability," at one end of the spectrum, or "fair
chance," on the other, of success on the merits. Gilda v. PGA Tour, Inc., 936
F.2d 417, 422 (9th Cir. 1991). Of course, a lesser showing of probability of
success requires a greater showing of harm, and vice-versa. See, e.g., id. at
422-23.
A claim for copyright infringement requires that the plaintiff prove (1) its
ownership of the copyright in a particular work, and (2) the defendant's copying
of a substantial, legally protectable portion of such work. Pasillas v.
McDonald's Corp., 927 F.2d 440, 442 (9th Cir. 1991). "An author can claim to
'own' only an original manner of expressing ideas or an original arrangement of
facts." Cooling Systems and Flexibles, Inc. v. [*1293] Stuart Radiator, Inc.,
777 F.2d 485, 491 (9th Cir. 1985). The plaintiff need only show that the
defendant copied the protectable portion [**9] of its work to establish a prima
facie case of infringement.
a. Plaintiffs' Ownership Of The Copyrights
Plaintiffs claim that the Honda commercial: (1) "infringes Plaintiffs'
copyrights in the James Bond films by intentionally copying numerous specific
scenes from the films;" and (2) "independently infringes Plaintiffs' copyright
in the James Bond character as expressed and delineated in those films."
Plaintiffs' Opening Memo, at 14.
Neither side disputes that Plaintiffs own registered copyrights to each of
the sixteen films which Plaintiffs claim "define and delineate the James Bond
character." Plaintiffs' Opening Memo re: Preliminary Injunction Motion, at 14.
However, Defendants argue that because Plaintiffs have not shown that they own
the copyright to the James Bond character in particular, Plaintiffs cannot
prevail. Defendants' Opposition Memo re: Preliminary Injunction Motion, at 22
(citing Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 216
F.2d 945, 949-50 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 971, 99 L. Ed. 756, 75
S. Ct. 532 (1955) (evidence at bar suggesting that assignment from author to
plaintiffs did not include copyrights [**10] to author's characters) [the Sam
Spade case]). Specifically, Defendants claim that James Bond has appeared in two
films in which Plaintiffs hold no copyright -- "Casino Royale" and "Never Say
Never Again" -- and therefore, Plaintiffs cannot have exclusive rights to the
James Bond character.
It appears that Defendants misconstrue Plaintiffs' claim. First, Plaintiffs
do not allege that Defendants have violated Plaintiffs' copyright in the James
Bond character itself, but rather in the James Bond character as expressed and
delineated in Plaintiffs' sixteen films. To the extent that copyright law only
protects original expression, not ideas, n4 Plaintiffs' argument is that the
James Bond character as developed in the sixteen films is the copyrighted work
at issue, not the James Bond character generally. See, e.g., Anderson v.
Stallone, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11109, 11 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1161, 1989 WL 206431,
*6 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (holding that Rocky characters as developed in three "Rocky"
movies "constitute expression protected by copyright independent from the story
in which they are contained"). Second, there is sufficient authority for the
proposition that a plaintiff [**11] who holds copyrights in a film series
acquires copyright protection as well for the expression of any significant
characters portrayed therein. See, e.g., New Line Cinema Corp. v. Bertlesman
Music Group, 693 F. Supp. 1517, 1521 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("Because New Line has
valid copyrights in the Nightmare [on Elm Street film] series, it is clear that
it has acquired copyright protection as well for the character of Freddy.")
(emphasis added); Warner Bros. Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 720 F.2d 231,
235 (2d Cir. 1983) (same). And third, the Sam Spade case, 216 F.2d at 949-50, on
which Defendants' rely, is distinguishable on its facts because Sam Spade dealt
specifically with the transfer of rights from author to film producer rather
than the copyrightability of a character as developed and expressed in a series
of films.
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n4 Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1109-10 (9th Cir.
1970).
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Accordingly, Plaintiffs will likely satisfy the "ownership" prong of [**12]
the test. See also infra discussion re: Plaintiffs' copyright ownership in
context of summary judgment discussion, at 27-29.
b. What Elements Of Plaintiffs' Work Are Protectable Under Copyright Law
Plaintiffs contend that Defendants' commercial infringes in two independent
ways: (1) by reflecting specific scenes from the 16 films; and (2) by the male
protagonist's possessing James Bond's unique character traits as developed in
the films.
Defendants respond that Plaintiffs are simply trying to gain a monopoly over
the "action/spy/police hero" genre which is contrary to the purposes of
copyright law. Specifically, Defendants argue that the allegedly infringed
elements identified by Plaintiffs are not protectable because: (1) the
helicopter [*1294] chase scene in the Honda commercial is a common theme that
naturally flows from most action genre films, and the woman and villain in the
film are but stock characters that are not protectable; and (2) under the Ninth
Circuit's Sam Spade decision, the James Bond character does not constitute the
"story being told," but is rather an unprotected dramatic character.
(1) Whether Film Scenes Are Copyrightable
In their opening brief, [**13] Plaintiffs contend that each of their
sixteen films contains distinctive scenes that together comprise the classic
James Bond adventure: "a high-thrill chase of the ultra-cool British charmer and
his beautiful and alarming sidekick by a grotesque villain in which the hero
escapes through wit aided by high-tech gadgetry." Plaintiffs' Opening Memo re:
Preliminary Injunction Motion, at 20. Defendants argue that these elements are
naturally found in any action film and are therefore unprotected
"scenes-a-faire." n5
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n5 Situations, incidents, or events that naturally flow from a common theme,
or setting or basic plot premise are "scenes-a-faire." See, e.g., Nichols v.
Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282
U.S. 902, 75 L. Ed. 795, 51 S. Ct. 216 (1931); 3 M. & D. Nimmer, Nimmer on
Copyright, § 13.03[B][4], at 13-80-82 (1994) (discussing scenes-a-faire
doctrine). In Universal City Studios v. Film Ventures International, Inc., 543
F. Supp. 1134, 1141 (C.D. Cal. 1982), this Court granted a preliminary
injunction to the copyright holders of "Jaws" finding that they were likely to
prevail on the issue of intrinsic substantial similarity against the movie
"Great White," another shark-attack film. In so doing, the Court rejected the
defendants' characterization of the plaintiffs' expression of ideas as
unprotectable scenes-a-faire: "The Court rejects Defendants' overly expansive
view of that which falls within the unprotected sphere of general ideas and
scenes a faire, and instead adopts Plaintiffs' characterization of that which
constitutes the expression of ideas." Id. at 1141. It appears that in this case,
as in Universal, Defendants are attempting to claim that all elements of the
commercial are unprotected, and therefore, the commercial as a whole is
non-infringing. This Court rejected this approach in Universal, and does so here
as well.
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Both sides provide expert testimony to support their claims that such scenes
are distinctive or generic, and both sides question the qualifications -- and
hence, the testimony -- of the others' experts. n6 Indeed, there is a notable
difference in the backgrounds of the parties' experts. Plaintiffs' impressive
array of James Bond experts includes: (1) Lee Pfeiffer, a writer and James Bond
expert whose 1992 book is entitled "The Incredible World of 007" -- he has
appeared on many radio and television programs as a James Bond expert; (2)
Richard B. Jewell, a professor at the USC School of Cinema-Television who
recently taught a course on James Bond films in the Spring of 1994; (3) Mark
Cerulli, a writer/producer at HBO who has written articles and film reviews of
many of the Bond films; (4) Drew Casper, a professor and film historian at the
USC School of Cinema-Television; and (5) Irwin Coster, president of Coster Music
Research Enterprises, Inc. Defendants' less-impressive expert list includes: (1)
Arnold Margolin, a writer and producer, who considers himself to be "conversant
with the genre to which James Bond and his films belong," because he has been a
fan of Bond films since 1959 [**15] and has written several screenplays in the
"spy film" genre; and (2) Hal Needham, a movie director responsible for the
"Cannonball Run" and "Smokey and the Bandit" comedy film series.
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n6 As discussed and agreed upon by the parties during the February 10, 1995
telephone status conference, the Court stated that it would not rule
specifically on each of the myriad objections interposed by both parties, but
would instead refer to the experts' declarations when helpful and admissible.
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Plaintiffs' experts describe in a fair amount of detail how James Bond films
are the source of a genre rather than imitators of a broad "action/spy film"
genre as Defendants contend. Specifically, film historian Casper explains how
the James Bond films represented a fresh and novel approach because they
"hybridized the spy thriller with the genres of adventure, comedy (particularly,
social satire and slapstick), and fantasy. This amalgam . . . was also a
departure from the series' literary source, namely writer Ian Fleming's novels."
[**16] Casper Decl., P 9. Casper also states: "I also believe that this
distinct melange of genres, which was also seminal . . . created a protagonist,
antagonist, sexual consort, type of mission, type of [*1295] exotic setting,
type of mood, type of dialogue, type of music, etc. that was not there in the
subtype of the spy thriller films of that ilk hitherto." Id., P 11. In addition,
Professor Jewell and Lee Pfeiffer describe the aforementioned elements in more
detail and how these are in essence copied by the Honda commercial. n7
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n7 In response, Defendants' expert Needham suggests that the three 1960s
British television series "The Avengers," "The Saint," and "Danger Man" are
precursors of the Bond films and that the Bond films copy from them.
Furthermore, expert Margolin goes through an extrinsic test analysis of the
differences between Plaintiffs' films and the Honda commercial.
In rebuttal, Plaintiffs present the declarations of: (1) Brian Clemens, who
produced many episodes of "The Avengers" and "Danger Man," as well as having
worked on "The Saint"; and (2) David Rogers, a leading authority on "The
Avengers" and Patrick McGoohan, the star of "Danger Man." Both experts state
that no part of the Honda commercial resembles either the "The Avengers,"
"Danger Man," or "The Saint," and that the commercial is a copy of a James Bond
film.
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Based on Plaintiffs' experts' greater familiarity with the James Bond films,
as well as a review of Plaintiffs' James Bond montage and defense expert Needham
's video montage of the "action/spy" genre films, it is clear that James Bond
films are unique in their expression of the spy thriller idea. A filmmaker could
produce a helicopter chase scene in practically an indefinite number of ways,
but only James Bond films bring the various elements Casper describes together
in a unique and original way.
Thus, the Court believes that Plaintiffs will likely succeed on their claim
that their expression of the action film sequences in the James Bond films is
copyrightable as a matter of law. n8
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n8 Of course, these film sequences would be only "scenes-a-faire" without
James Bond. It is Bond that makes a James Bond film as the following section
bears out.
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(2) Whether James Bond Character Is Copyrightable
The law in the Ninth Circuit is unclear as to when visually-depicted
characters such as James Bond can be afforded [**18] copyright protection. In
the landmark Sam Spade case, Warner Bros., 216 F.2d at 950, the Ninth Circuit
held that the literary character Sam Spade was not copyrightable because he did
not constitute "the story being told." The court opined: "It is conceivable that
the character really constitutes the story being told, but if the character is
only the chessman in the game of telling the story he is not within the area of
the protection afforded by the copyright." Id.
Two subsequent Ninth Circuit decisions have cast doubt on the continued
viability of the Sam Spade holding as applied to graphic characters. In Walt
Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 755 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1132, 59 L. Ed. 2d 94, 99 S. Ct. 1054 (1979), the circuit panel
held that several Disney comic book characters were protected by copyright. In
acknowledging the Sam Spade opinion, the court reasoned that because "comic book
characters . . . are distinguishable from literary characters, the [Sam Spade]
language does not preclude protection of Disney's characters." Id. The Air
Pirates decision may be viewed as either: (1) following Sam Spade [**19] by
implicitly holding that Disney's graphic characters constituted the story being
told; or (2) applying a less stringent test for the protectability of graphic
characters. See Anderson, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11109, at *18, 1989 WL 206431,
at *6-7 (identifying two views and citing 1 M. Nimmer, The Law of Copyright, §
2-12, at 2-176 (1988) (interpreting Air Pirates as limiting the "story being
told" test to word portraits, not graphic depictions)). One rationale for
adopting the second view is that, "as a practical matter, a graphically depicted
character is much more likely than a literary character to be fleshed out in
sufficient detail so as to warrant copyright protection." Anderson, 1989 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11109, at *18, 1989 WL 206431, at *7. However, as one district court
warned, "this fact does not warrant the creation of separate analytical
paradigms for protection of characters in the two mediums." Id.
A second Ninth Circuit opinion issued in 1988 did little to clarify Air
Pirates' impact on the Sam Spade test. In Olson v. National Broadcasting Co.,
855 F.2d 1446, 1451-52 n.6 (9th Cir. 1988), the court cited with approval the
Sam Spade "story being told" test and declined to characterize this language as
[*1296] dicta. [**20] Later in the opinion, the court cited the Air Pirates
decision along with Second Circuit precedent, n9 recognizing that "cases
subsequent to [the Sam Spade decision] have allowed copyright protection for
characters who are especially distinctive." Id. at 1452. Olson also noted that
"copyright protection may be afforded to characters visually depicted in a
television series or in a movie." Id. However, later in the opinion, the court
distanced itself from the character delineation test applied by these other
cases, referring to it as "the more lenient standard[] adopted elsewhere." Id.
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n9 The Second Circuit has adopted an alternate test for determining whether
dramatic characters are protectable under copyright law. In the landmark case of
Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121, the court held that copyright protection is granted to
a character if it is developed with enough specificity so as to constitute
protectable expression. This has been viewed to be a less stringent standard
than Sam Spade's "story being told" test.
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There have been no Ninth Circuit cases on the protectability of
visually-depicted characters since Olson, and therefore, it behooves this Court
to analyze James Bond's status under the Sam Spade/Olson/Ninth Circuit "story
being told" test, as well as under the Air Pirates/Second Circuit "character
delineation" test.
Predictably, Plaintiffs claim that under either test, James Bond's character
as developed in the sixteen films is sufficiently unique and deserves copyright
protection, just as Judge Keller ruled that Rocky and his cohorts were
sufficiently unique. See Anderson, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11109, at *20, 1989 WL
206431, at *7-8. Plaintiffs point to various character traits that are specific
to Bond -- i.e. his cold-bloodedness; his overt sexuality; his love of martinis
"shaken, not stirred;" his marksmanship; his "license to kill" and use of guns;
his physical strength; his sophistication -- some of which, Plaintiffs' claim,
appear in the Honda commercial's hero.
On the other hand, Defendants assert that, like Sam Spade, James Bond is not
the "story being told," but instead "has changed enormously from film to film,
from actor to actor, and from year to year." Defendants' Opp. Memo re:
Preliminary [**22] Injunction Motion, at 22. Moreover, Defendants contend
that even if Bond's character is sufficiently delineated, there is so little
character development in the Honda commercial's hero that Plaintiffs cannot
claim that Defendants copied more than the broader outlines of Bond's
personality. See, e.g., Smith v. Weinstein, 578 F. Supp. 1297, 1303 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 738 F.2d 419 (2d Cir. 1984) ("no character infringement claim can succeed
unless plaintiff's original conception sufficiently developed the character, and
defendants have copied this development and not merely the broader outlines").
Reviewing the evidence and arguments, the Court believes that James Bond is
more like Rocky than Sam Spade -- in essence, that James Bond is a copyrightable
character under either the Sam Spade "story being told test" or the Second
Circuit's "character delineation" test. Like Rocky, n10 Sherlock Holmes, Tarzan,
and Superman, n11 James Bond has certain character traits that have been
developed over time through the sixteen films in which he appears. Contrary to
Defendants' assertions, because many actors can play Bond is a testament to the
fact that Bond is a unique character [**23] whose specific qualities remain
constant despite the change in actors. See Pfeiffer and Lisa, The Incredible
World of 007, at 8 ("[Despite the different actors who have played the part]
James Bond is like an old reliable friend."). Indeed, audiences do not watch
Tarzan, Superman, Sherlock Holmes, or James Bond for the story, they watch these
films to see their heroes at work. A James Bond film without James Bond is not a
James Bond film. Moreover, as discussed more specifically below, the Honda Man's
character, from his appearance to his grace under pressure, is substantially
similar to Plaintiffs' Bond.
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n10 See Anderson, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11109, at *20, 1989 WL 206431, at *7
(discussing copyrightability of Rocky characters).
n11 See Warner Bros. Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 654 F.2d 204, 208-09
(2d Cir. 1981) (comparing Superman and the "Greatest American Hero" character
and concluding that they are not substantially similar).
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Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs will probably succeed on
their [**24] claim that James Bond is a copyrightable character [*1297] under
either the "story being told" or the "character delineation" test.
c. Defendants' Alleged Infringement
After identifying the scope of Plaintiffs' copyrightable work, the Court must
focus on whether Defendants copied Plaintiffs' work. Since direct evidence of
actual copying is typically unavailable, the plaintiff may demonstrate copying
circumstantially by showing: (1) that the defendant had access to the plaintiff
's work, and (2) that the defendant's work is substantially similar to the
plaintiff's. Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1356 (9th Cir. 1990).
(1) Access
To demonstrate access, the plaintiff must show that the defendant had "an
opportunity to view or to copy plaintiff's work." Sid & Marty Krofft Television
Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1172 (9th Cir. 1977).
Access may not be inferred through mere "speculation or conjecture." Ferguson v.
National Broadcasting Co., 584 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1978). There must be a
reasonable possibility to view plaintiff's work, not just a bare possibility.
See Meta-Film Associates, Inc. v. MCA, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 1346, 1355 [**25]
(C.D. Cal. 1984).
In this case, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants conceded access during the
telephone conference with the Court on January 4, 1995. Defendants raise access
as an issue, arguing that the inventor of the Honda commercial, Gary Yoshida,
states in his declaration that he has never watched more than a few minutes of
any one James Bond film, and that he got the idea for the commercial from the
climax scene in "Aliens."
The Court notes that: (1) Yoshida's admission that he has at least viewed
portions of the James Bond films on television; (2) the "Honda man's" having
been referred to as "James Bob"; and (3) the casting director's desire to cast
"James Bond"-type actors and actresses, are factors sufficient to establish
Defendants' access to Plaintiffs' work. Moreover, the sheer worldwide popularity
and distribution of the Bond films allows the Court to indulge a presumption of
access. See, e.g., Warner Bros. Inc., 654 F.2d at 208 (holding that access to
Superman character assumed based on character's worldwide popularity).
Thus, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs will probably succeed on their
claim that Defendants had access to Plaintiffs' work.
(2) [**26] Substantial Similarity Test
The Ninth Circuit has established a two-part process for determining
"substantial similarity" by applying both the "extrinsic" and "intrinsic" tests.
Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164-65. "The [Krofft] test permits a finding of
infringement only if a plaintiff proves both substantial similarity of general
ideas under the 'extrinsic test' and substantial similarity of the protectable
expression of those ideas under the 'intrinsic test.'" Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1356
(emphasis in original). This "idea-expression" dichotomy is particularly elusive
to courts and the substantial similarity test necessarily involves decisions
made on a case-by-case basis. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp.,
274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960) ("Obviously, no principle can be stated as to
when an imitator has gone beyond the 'idea,' and has borrowed its 'expression.'
Decisions must therefore inevitably be ad hoc.").
(a) Extrinsic Test
The "extrinsic" test compares specific, objective criteria of two works on
the basis of an analytic dissection of the following elements of each work --
plot, theme, dialogue, mood, setting, pace, characters, and sequence [**27] of
events. Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1359. Evidence is usually supplied by expert
testimony comparing the works at issue. Because the extrinsic test relies on
objective analytical criteria, "this question may often be decided as a matter
of law." Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164.
Here, both Plaintiffs' and Defendants' experts go through specific analyses
of the similarities in ideas between the James Bond films and the Honda
commercial. Plaintiffs contend that the commercial illegally copies specific
protected portions of the James Bond films and the James Bond character itself.
Defendants claim that the commercial depicts a generic action scene with a
generic hero, all of which is not protected by [*1298] copyright.
Alternatively, Defendants argue that they did not copy a substantial portion of
any one James Bond work to be liable for infringement as a matter of law.
Viewing Plaintiffs' and Defendants' videotapes and examining the experts'
statements, Plaintiffs will likely prevail on this issue because there is
substantial similarity between the specific protected elements of the James Bond
films and the Honda commercial: (1) the theme, plot, and sequence both involve
the idea of a handsome [**28] hero who, along with a beautiful woman, lead a
grotesque villain on a high-speed chase, the male appears calm and unruffled,
there are hints of romance between the male and female, and the protagonists
escape with the aid of intelligence and gadgetry; (2) the settings both involve
the idea of a high-speed chase with the villain in hot pursuit; (3) the mood and
pace of both works are fast-paced and involve hi-tech effects, with loud,
exciting horn music in the background; n12 (4) both the James Bond and Honda
commercial dialogues are laced with dry wit and subtle humor; (5) the characters
of Bond and the Honda man are very similar in the way they look and act -- both
heros are young, tuxedo-clad, British-looking men with beautiful women in tow
and grotesque villains close at hand; moreover, both men exude uncanny calm
under pressure, exhibit a dry sense of humor and wit, and are attracted to, and
are attractive to, their female companions.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n12 In Shaw, the Ninth Circuit noted, in comparing two screenplays, that the
fact that both works were "fast-paced, have ominous and cynical moods . . . ,
and are set in large cities," did not weigh heavily in the panel's analysis
because "these similarities are common to any action adventure series." 919 F.2d
at 1363. Nonetheless, this situation in the case at bar is different because the
mood, setting, and pace of Plaintiffs' and Defendants' works can be visually
compared, as opposed to merely compared in the abstract.
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [**29]
In addition, several specific aspects of the Honda commercial appear to have
been lifted from the James Bond films:
(1) In "The Spy Who Loved Me," James Bond is in a white sports car, a
beautiful woman passenger at his side, driving away down a deserted road from
some almost deadly adventure, when he is suddenly attacked by a chasing
helicopter whose bullets he narrowly avoids by skillfully weaving the car down
the road at high speed. At the beginning of the Honda commercial, the Honda man
turns to his companion and says, "That wasn't so bad"; to which the woman
replies, "Well, I wouldn't congratulate yourself quite yet" -- implying that
they had just escaped some prior danger. Suddenly, a helicopter appears from out
of nowhere and the adventure begins.
(2) In "Dr. No.," the villain has metal hands. In the Honda commercial, the
villain uses his metal-encased hands to cling onto the roof of the car after he
jumps onto it.
(3) In "Goldfinger," Bond's sports car has a roof which Bond can cause to
detach with the flick of a lever. In the Honda commercial, the Honda del Sol has
a detachable roof which the Honda man uses to eject the villain.
(4) In "Moonraker," the villainous henchman, [**30] Jaws, sporting a broad
grin revealing metallic teeth and wearing a pair of oversized goggles, jumps out
of an airplane. In the Honda commercial, the villain, wearing similar goggles
and revealing metallic teeth, jumps out of a helicopter.
(5) In "The Spy Who Loved Me," Jaws assaults a vehicle in which Bond and his
female sidekick are trying to make their escape. In the Honda commercial, the
villain jumps onto the roof of the Honda del Sol and scrapes at the roof,
attempting to hold on and possibly get inside the vehicle.
(6) In "You Only Live Twice," a chasing helicopter drops a magnetic line down
to snag a speeding car. In the Honda commercial, the villain is dropped down to
the moving car and is suspended from the helicopter by a cable. n13
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n13 See also Complaint, P 30. Plaintiffs identify a seventh similarity that
is less compelling, but nonetheless interesting: In "Diamonds Are Forever," Sean
Connery, playing James Bond, wears a toupee to cover his, by then, balding pate,
a fact widely reported in the media and repeated in the Bond literature. In the
Honda commercial, once the car's roof flies off flinging the villain into the
air, the woman remarks, "Don't you just love the wind through your hair?," to
which the man replies, "What I have left."
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [**31]
[*1299] In sum, the extrinsic ideas that are inherent parts of the James
Bond films appear to be substantially similar to those in the Honda commercial.
n14
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n14 Contrary to Defendants' implications, as a matter of law, the fact that
the commercial is not a full-length movie does not preclude a finding of
copyright infringement. See, e.g., New Line Cinema, 693 F. Supp. at 1526-27
(comparing music video to film series); Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1161-62 (comparing
TV series to commercials).
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b) Intrinsic Test
The "intrinsic" test asks whether the "total concept and feel" of the two
works is also substantially similar. Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352,
1357 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052, 84 L. Ed. 2d 817, 105 S. Ct.
1753 (1985). This is a subjective test that requires a determination of whether
the ordinary reasonable audience could recognize the Defendants' commercial as a
picturization of Plaintiffs' copyrighted work. See Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d
1289, 1292 (9th Cir.), [**32] cert. denied, 474 U.S. 826, 88 L. Ed. 2d 69, 106
S. Ct. 85 (1985).
Because this is a subjective determination, the comparison during the
intrinsic test is left for the trier of fact. This would involve showing the
Honda commercial to the members of the jury so that they may compare the same
with the sixteen Bond films at issue. Viewing the evidence, it appears likely
that the average viewer would immediately think of James Bond when viewing the
Honda commercial, even with the subtle changes in accent and music.
As in this Court's Jaws opinion, Universal, 543 F. Supp. at 1141, the Court
finds that Defendants' attempt to characterize all of the alleged similarities
between the works as scenes-a-faire to be unavailing. There are many ways to
express a helicopter chase scene, but only Plaintiffs' Bond films would do it
the way the Honda commercial did with these very similar characters, music,
pace, and mood. n15 Plaintiffs are therefore likely to prevail on the "intrinsic
test."
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n15 During the hearing, defense counsel pointed out several differences --
the fact that the "Honda man" was blonder than Bond, the fact that the
commercial was more "sepia" in tone than the Bond films, etc. -- that appear to
this Court to be largely immaterial differences that would not be immediately
apparent to the average viewer.
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [**33]
(3) Independent Creation
After the plaintiff has satisfied both the "access" and "substantial
similarity" prongs of the test, the burden then shifts to the defendant to show
that the defendant's work was not a copy but rather was independently created.
Kamar Int'l, Inc. v. Russ Berrie and Co., 657 F.2d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 1981).
Defendants claim that their commercial was independently created, as
evidenced from the Yoshida declaration stating that he was inspired not by James
Bond, but by "Aliens." Moreover, Defendants claim that their intent is
irrelevant in determining whether their commercial infringes or not.
Plaintiffs raise two points in response: (1) there is other evidence before
the Court to suggest that Honda never abandoned the idea of using James Bond as
the basis for its commercial -- for example, the casting director's notes,
Yoshida's reference in his deposition to the Honda Man as "James," etc.; and (2)
this evidence of intent is relevant to counter Defendants' claim of independent
creation. See, e.g., New Line Cinema, 693 F. Supp. at 1530.
For the reasons discussed above, Defendants' evidence is neither very strong
nor credible; it is highly [**34] unlikely that Defendants will be able to show
that they created their commercial separate and apart from the James Bond
concept. Accordingly, Plaintiffs should prevail on this issue.
(4) The Fair Use Doctrine
Finally, as a separate defense to copyright infringement, Defendants claim
that their use of Plaintiffs' work is protected under the fair use doctrine,
which protects parodies, for example. Under the Supreme Court's recent decision
in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., U.S. , 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994), a
subsequent work may not infringe on an original upon examining the following
four-prong statutory factors: (1) the purpose and character of the use,
including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational [*1300] purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use on the potential for, or value
of, the copyrighted work. See also Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 547, 85 L. Ed. 2d 588, 105 S. Ct. 2218 (1985) (citing
17 U.S.C. § 107). The Court shall analyze each [**35] factor in turn below.
First, the Court must look to whether Defendants' use is of a commercial
nature and whether, and to what extent, the infringing work is transformative of
the original. 114 S. Ct. at 1171. In Campbell, the Supreme Court noted that a
purported parody would not be protected if it is "commentary that has no
critical bearing on the substance or style of the original composition, which
the alleged infringer merely uses to get attention or to avoid the drudgery in
working up something fresh . . ." Id. at 1172. Here, Plaintiffs contend that the
Honda ad is completely commercial in its nature and does not comment on the
earlier Bond films. Defendants claim that their commercial is a parody on the
action film genre, and further, is more than simply a commercial because of its
artistic merit. On balance, Plaintiffs should prevail on this issue -- the
Supreme Court in Campbell notes that "the use . . . of a copyrighted work to
advertise a product, even in parody, will be entitled to less indulgence under
the first factor of the fair use enquiry, than the sale of the parody for its
own sake . . . ." 114 S. Ct. at 1174. See also Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller
Brewing [**36] Co., 737 F. Supp. 826, 832 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (beer commercial
copying music video); D.C. Comics, Inc. v. Crazy Eddie, Inc., 205 U.S.P.Q. 1177
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (commercial copying Superman).
Second, the Court must recognize that "some works are closer to the core of
intended copyright protection than others," and thus are more deserving of
protection. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1175 & cases cited therein (e.g. fictional
works are closer to the core than fact-based works). Plaintiffs view their films
as just such core-predictable work, while Defendants see their work as generic,
spy thriller fare. Again, Plaintiffs should prevail on this issue because their
work has created its own unique niche in the larger "action film" genre.
Third, the Court must look to the quantitative and qualitative extent of the
copying involved. A parodist may appropriate only that amount of the original
necessary to achieve his or her purpose. See Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 438
(9th Cir. 1986). The amount that may be used diminishes the less the purpose is
to critique the original and the more that the parody serves as a substitute for
the original. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1176. Plaintiffs [**37] claim that the
Honda commercial is a total appropriation; Defendants describe the two versions
of their commercial as "de minimis" appropriation, if at all. Plaintiffs should
prevail on this issue: as mentioned above, the brevity of the infringing work
when compared with the original does not excuse copying.
And fourth, the Court must measure "'the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work.'" Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1177
(citing 17 U.S.C. § 107(4)). The task is to distinguish between "'biting
criticism [that merely] suppresses demand [and] copyright infringement [which]
usurps it.'" Id. at 1178 (citing Fisher, 794 F.2d at 438). Where the
appropriation involves "mere duplication for commercial purposes," market harm
is presumed. Id. at 1177. Plaintiffs allege that "one of the most commercially
lucrative aspects of the copyrights is their value as lending social cachet and
upscale image to cars" and that Defendants' commercial unfairly usurps this
benefit. Plaintiffs' Opening Memo re: Preliminary Injunction Motion, at 32.
Defendants counter that Plaintiffs present no evidence that their commercial
will dissuade viewers [**38] from watching the Bond films. Plaintiffs should
win on this issue as well; it is likely that James Bond's association with a
low-end Honda model will threaten its value in the eyes of future upscale
licensees.
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that Plaintiffs will likely succeed
on this issue [*1301] and Defendants will be unable to show fair use or
parody.
3. Balance Of Relative Harms
It is well-settled in this circuit that once a copyrightholder has shown a
likelihood of success on the merits based on access and substantial similarity,
irreparable injury is presumed, warranting a preliminary injunction. See, e.g.,
Universal, 543 F. Supp. at 1139. Irreparable injury is presumed because the
copyright owner's right to exploit its work is unique. Robert Stigwood Group,
Ltd. v. Sperber, 457 F.2d 50, 55 (2d Cir. 1972).
As discussed above, Plaintiffs have established a likelihood of success on
the merits and therefore, the Court presumes irreparable injury. Moreover, the
Court notes that Plaintiffs have shown they have been specifically harmed by the
continued airing of Defendants' commercial in two ways: (1) prolonged lost
licensing revenue (purportedly in the millions [**39] of dollars); and (2)
dilution of the copyrights' long-term value. The latter is especially true given
Plaintiffs' own deal with BMW for a special movie tie-in in conjunction with
Plaintiffs' release of the first James Bond movie in six years, "Goldeneye" -- a
fact undisputed by Defendants. See Stolber Depo., at 81:9-84:2. Indeed, the
Court can very well imagine that a majority of the public, upon viewing the
Honda commercial and a future BMW ad, would come to the conclusion that James
Bond was endorsing two automobile companies. Such a scenario would drastically
decrease the long-term value of Plaintiffs' James Bond franchise.
In response, Defendants assert that aside from the fact that Plaintiffs will
not prevail on the merits of their claim, the balance of equities tips in
Defendants' favor for three reasons: (1) Plaintiffs have waited too long before
seeking an injunction -- Defendants began airing the commercial on October 24,
1994, Plaintiffs did not complain until mid-December 1994 and did not move for a
preliminary injunction until January 23, 1995; (2) Plaintiffs have waived their
rights to equitable relief by not objecting to the use of the Bond character in
"Cannonball [**40] Run," "Casino Royale," and "Never Say Never Again"; and (3)
unlike Plaintiffs' speculative losses, Defendants have already poured in over $
6 million into the Honda commercial ($ 2 million in production costs plus $ 4
million in media placement) and stand to lose much more because of the seasonal
sales of the Honda del Sol, n16 should the injunction issue.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n16 See Spyra Decl. in Opposition to Preliminary Injunction Motion, PP 6-7.
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
All three of Defendants' arguments fail because: (1) Plaintiff's counsel
states in his declaration that the commercial was not approved by any of the
major networks as of December 21, 1994, and therefore, Plaintiffs' discovery of
the commercial during the weekend of December 17-18, 1994 was reasonable; (2)
Plaintiffs did not equitably waive their rights in the James Bond character as
to "Cannonball Run" (an obvious parody), "Casino Royale" (Ian Fleming had sold
the rights to "Casino Royale" before Plaintiffs acquired their movie rights to
make their 16 films and Plaintiffs do [**41] not claim that the James Bond
character in "Casino Royale" is the same as theirs), and "Never Say Never Again"
(Plaintiffs tried to assert their rights in a British court, but the court
allowed for the release of "Never Say Never Again" as a remake of Plaintiffs'
"Thunderball"); n17 and (3) the amount of Defendants' alleged loss, while
relevant to determining the size of the bond Plaintiffs must post, does not
change the Court's conclusion that the injunction should issue based on its
finding that Plaintiffs are likely to prevail on their copyright claim.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n17 Plaintiffs also adequately explain the existence of a very Bond-like Diet
Coke commercial that appears in Needham's film montage. Apparently, Plaintiffs
contacted Coke after the spot aired, demanding that it cease and desist; Coke
agreed without Plaintiffs having to resort to litigation.
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
B. Defendants' Summary Judgment Motion
As stated above, Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiffs'
copyright infringement claim on three grounds: (1) Plaintiffs [**42] are not
the exclusive owners of the elements of the James Bond character they seek to
protect; (2) Plaintiffs' alleged similarities [*1302] are not protected by
copyright; and (3) their commercial is not substantially similar to any of
Plaintiffs' films or characters. n18
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n18 Defendants also move to have Plaintiffs' remaining counts for false
endorsement, false designation of origin, dilution of trademark and unfair
competition, unfair business practices, and intentional and negligent
interference with prospective business advantage, dismissed on the ground that
these claims "rest on alleged substantial similarity between the Honda
commercial and Plaintiffs' works . . . ." Defendants' Opening Memo re: Summary
Judgment Motion, at 33. However, because the Court DENIES Defendants' summary
judgment motion as to the "substantial similarity" issue, the Court need not
reach the further issue of whether the remaining counts should be dismissed.
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
1. The Summary Judgment Standard
Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal [**43] Rules of Civil Procedure, a court may
grant summary judgment upon finding that "there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law." Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(c). Under Rule 56, a non-moving party must set forth
specific facts showing that there exists a genuine issue of material fact for
trial. See Kaiser Cement Corp. v. Fischbach and Moore, Inc., 793 F.2d 1100,
1103-04 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 949, 93 L. Ed. 2d 384, 107 S. Ct. 435
(1986). Any inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in
the light most favorable to the party opposing the summary judgment motion. See
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 89 L. Ed.
2d 538, 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986).
2. Defendants' Motion Fails On Its Merits
a. Plaintiffs Own The Copyrights To The James Bond Character As Well As The
16 Films At Issue
Defendants first contend that Plaintiffs do not exclusively own a copyright
in "James Bond" because this visually-depicted character appeared in at least
three other productions: the film and television versions of "Casino Royale" and
the film version of [**44] "Never Say Never Again." Defendants primarily argue
that because Plaintiffs admit that the James Bond character in "Never Say Never
Again" is exactly the same character depicted in Plaintiffs' 16 films,
Plaintiffs do not have exclusive ownership, under Krofft, of the James Bond
character as expressed and delineated in these films.
Defendants' arguments fail for several reasons. First, the Krofft case does
not stand for the proposition that a copyrightholder must have "exclusive"
ownership of the copyright at issue, but only "ownership" of such a right.
Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1162. Indeed, if this were the case, joint ownership of
copyrights could never be recognized -- in fact, Plaintiffs herein assert
co-ownership of these rights. Second, as stated above, ownership of a copyright
in a film confers copyright ownership of any significant characters as
delineated therein. And third, any claim that Plaintiffs abandoned or waived
their rights in the James Bond character must be accompanied by a showing of an
"intentional relinquishment of a known right with knowledge of its existence and
the intent to relinquish it." United States v. King Features Entertainment,
Inc., 843 [**45] F.2d 394, 399 (9th Cir. 1988).
There is no evidence to suggest that Plaintiffs have ever relinquished their
rights to the James Bond character as expressed in their films. First,
Plaintiffs do not assert that the character in either of the two "Casino Royale"
productions is the same as their James Bond portrayal; n19 and second,
Plaintiffs heavily litigated their right to enjoin "Never Say Never Again" from
ever being made -- the fact that Plaintiffs lost that litigation does not mean
that they waived their copyright claims, and Defendants have not cited, nor is
the Court aware of, any case that stands for this proposition. n20
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n19 Moreover, as mentioned above, Plaintiffs recognize that author Ian
Fleming had sold the movie rights to "Casino Royale" prior to Plaintiffs'
obtaining their rights to make their sixteen Bond films.
n20 Aside from Krofft, the only other case Defendants cite is Sam Spade, 216
F.2d at 949-50, for the proposition that "under basic principles of copyright
law, all other uses of the James Bond character affect the plaintiff's claim to
ownership." Defendants' Opening Memo re: Summary Judgment, at 10. However,
nowhere in that opinion does the Ninth Circuit make such a pronouncement; in
fact, Plaintiffs correctly characterize Sam Spade as holding that "a
copyrightholder [] cannot waive or abandon the protection afforded to a
copyright absent an express contractual provision to that effect." Plaintiffs'
Opposition Memo re: Summary Judgment Motion, at 26 n.10. This proposition is
fairly gleaned from the case and is consistent with the Ninth Circuit's holding
in King Features, 843 F.2d at 399. Also, Sam Spade factually dealt with the idea
that an author did not give up his copyrights to a character unless he
specifically waived them. This case does not involve Plaintiffs asserting that
Ian Fleming, the James Bond author, can no longer claim a copyright to the James
Bond character; rather, this action involves Plaintiffs' right to assert a valid
copyright claim against third parties without licenses or rights to the James
Bond character based on Plaintiffs' specific delineation and development of the
character in their 16 films.
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [**46]
[*1303] Thus, based on the evidence before it, the Court FINDS as a matter
of law that Plaintiffs own the copyright to the James Bond character as
expressed and delineated in their 16 films.
b. The Alleged Similarities Between The Works Are Protected By Copyright
Next, Defendants claim, as they did in opposing Plaintiffs' preliminary
injunction motion, that the similarities between the works alleged by Plaintiffs
are not protectable under copyright law. Defendants' arguments are largely
repetitive of those made and discussed above; however, Defendants also argue
that, as a matter of law, Plaintiffs' works are entitled to only "thin"
protection based on Defendants' citation to cases wherein courts have required
nearly identical copying for the copyrightholder to prevail. See, e.g., Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1442-44 (9th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1129, 115 S. Ct. 1176 (1995) (requiring copying of
computer program to be nearly identical because Apple had freely licensed 90% of
allegedly infringing program); Worth v. Selchow & Righter Co., 827 F.2d 569, 572
(9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 977, 99 L. Ed. 2d 482, [**47] 108 S.
Ct. 1271 (1988) (requiring greater showing of similarity between factually-based
works as opposed to between works of fiction).
But as Plaintiffs correctly point out, Defendants' cases are distinguishable
on their facts and as a matter of policy. While it is understandable to require
less protection of expressions of factual events or widely-licensed computer
programs, conversely, it is important that this Court require greater protection
for original works of fiction and the expression of the characters contained
therein.
Thus, the Court FINDS that the instant case, which involves a careful visual
delineation of a fictional character as developed over sixteen films and three
decades, requires greater protection of the fictional works at issue than that
accorded more factually-based or scientific works.
c. Issues Of Material Fact Exist Precluding This Court From Concluding That
The Works Are Substantially Similar
Finally, Defendants contend that the Honda commercial is not substantially
similar -- both extrinsically and intrinsically -- to Plaintiffs' protected
works. The Court FINDS, for the reasons set forth above, that Plaintiffs have
[**48] presented sufficient expert testimony n21 on the extrinsic test to
create a [*1304] triable issue as to whether the ideas expressed in the Honda
commercial are substantially similar to those protected ideas that appear in
Plaintiffs' films.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n21 Aside from the numerous declarations on file that address the
"substantial similarity" issue, Plaintiffs also submitted several other expert
declarations, including ones from: (1) Sir Kingley Amis, author of The James
Bond Dossier; (2) Professor Tony Bennett, author of Bond and Beyond: the
Political Career of a Popular Hero; and (3) John Cork, author of James Bond in
the '90s, a character bible for Danjaq to use with future James Bond films.
Defendants object to all of these declarations on similar grounds as before:
these experts won't assist the trier of fact, lack of foundation, lack of
personal knowledge, etc. Again, by the February 10, 1995 agreement, the Court
may rely on these declarations as it sees fit.
Defendants also move to strike Ann Marie Mortimer's declaration and the
exhibits attached thereto because Plaintiffs allegedly failed to turn over these
documents relevant to the two motions at issue: "Although aware of the fact that
ownership and enforcement of their rights would be an issue in these motions,
Plaintiffs failed to produce the agreements pursuant to which Plaintiffs
obtained any ownership rights or copyrights or any files relating to their
efforts to enforce the alleged rights in the James Bond character against
others. . . . Now, however, at the eleventh hour, and after forcing Defendants
to respond to a motion for preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs have provided the
Court with relevant documents." Defendants' Objection to Mortimer Decl., at 3
(emphasis and citations omitted).
The Court DENIES this request for the following reasons: First, when
Plaintiffs initially responded to Defendants' interrogatories and document
requests, Plaintiffs objected on the ground that these requests were overbroad
or irrelevant. Because Defendants concede in their summary judgment motion that
Plaintiffs own the rights to the sixteen films at issue here, the Court does not
believe that Plaintiffs intended to deliberately withhold these documents from
the defense; it appears instead that Plaintiffs honestly did not believe
ownership to be a contested issue. Second, Defendants have not been prejudiced
by this allegedly "late" production of Plaintiffs' evidence of ownership because
Defendants clearly knew, as the Court knew, as early as February 6, 1995 (when
Plaintiffs filed their reply papers in the preliminary injunction proceeding)
that Plaintiffs had claimed ownership of the sixteen films and had asserted
their rights in the James Bond character against other entities. Even though
Plaintiffs did not produce these documents until February 27, 1995, Defendants
had notice that Plaintiffs had asserted these claims; in other words, if
Defendants needed to review these documents prior to that time, they could have
moved to compel production, and yet they did not. As it is, Defendants had a
week to analyze these documents in time to file their reply papers by March 6,
1995. Finally, and most importantly, Defendants do not contest the substantive
importance or validity of the exhibits attached to the Mortimer declaration;
they simply contend that the Court should not consider these documents because
they were not turned over earlier. In light of the foregoing, the Court does not
believe there was any gamesmanship on Plaintiffs' part here, nor was there any
undue prejudice to Defendants because Plaintiffs did not file the Mortimer
exhibits until February 27, 1995.
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Moreover, because it finds that summary judgment is inappropriate under the
extrinsic test, the Court is further precluded from granting summary judgment
under the intrinsic test, because, at bottom, the jury must make a factual
determination as to whether the Honda commercial captures the total "concept and
feel" of Plaintiffs' Bond films. As the Ninth Circuit explained in Shaw:
"Because each of us differs, to some degree, in our capability to reason,
imagine, and react emotionally, subjective comparisons of literary works [and
films] that are objectively similar in their expression of ideas must be left to
the trier of fact." 919 F.2d at 1361.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 29, 1995
DAVID V. KENYON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE