NEW ERA PUBLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL, ApS,
Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v. CAROL PUBLISHING
GROUP, Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee
Nos. 90-7181, 90-7193
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
904 F.2d 152; 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 8726; 14 U.S.P.Q.2D
(BNA) 2030; Copy. L. Rep. (CCH) P26,579; 17 Media L. Rep.
1913
April 2, 1990, Argued
May 24, 1990, Decided
FEINBERG, Circuit Judge.
Defendant Carol Publishing Group appeals from a February 13, 1990 judgment of
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Louis L.
Stanton, J., permanently enjoining it from publishing a biography in its present
form, on grounds of copyright infringement. In an opinion reported at 729 F.
Supp. 992, the district court held that the biography's quotations from its
subject's writings -- all of which had been published -- did not constitute
"fair use" under 17 U.S.C. § 107, and that the copyright on one of the works
quoted from had expired. We disagree with the former conclusion but agree with
the latter, and thus reverse in part and affirm in part.
Background
The biography at issue in this appeal is entitled A Piece of Blue Sky:
Scientology, Dianetics and L. Ron Hubbard Exposed, and was written by Jonathan
Caven-Atack. (We will refer to A Piece of Blue Sky as "the book" and to
Caven-Atack as "the author.") The subject of the book is L. Ron Hubbard, the
controversial founder of the Church of Scientology (the Church), who died in
1986. [**3]
[*154] The author joined the Church when he was 19 and was a member for
almost nine years. In 1983, however, according to the author, his faith in the
Church was shaken by what he saw as the Church's repressive practices toward
dissident members. The author subsequently resigned from the Church, but
undertook a thorough investigation into the Church and Hubbard. During the
course of this inquiry, the author became convinced that the Church was a
dangerous cult, and that Hubbard was a vindictive and profoundly disturbed man.
The author's investigation culminated in the book, which, in its present
manuscript form, is 527 double-spaced pages in length. As its title makes plain,
the book is an unfavorable biography of Hubbard and a strong attack on
Scientology; the author's purpose is to expose what he believes is the
pernicious nature of the Church and the deceit that is the foundation of its
teachings. The book paints a highly unflattering portrait of Hubbard as a
thoroughgoing charlatan who lied relentlessly about his accomplishments. The
author's attitude toward his subject can be gauged by his descriptions of
Hubbard as "an arrogant, amoral egomaniac," "a paranoid, power [**4] hungry,
petty sadist," and -- perhaps ironically in light of the claims in this case --
"an outright plagiarist." n1 The book quotes widely from Hubbard's works, using
passages from Hubbard's writings both in the body of the text and at the
beginning of many chapters. The author had a rich vein of material to mine,
because Hubbard wrote prolifically on a wide variety of subjects, including
science fiction, philosophy and religion. We are informed that Hubbard published
nearly 600 fiction and non-fiction works during his lifetime, 111 of which are
in print.
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n1 We note here what should be obvious but nevertheless bears stating. We
express no view of our own as to Hubbard, his teachings or the Church. The
unflattering characterizations are those of the author of the book.
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Plaintiff-appellee/cross-appellant New Era Publications International, ApS is
the exclusive licensee of Hubbard's works. After learning that appellant Carol
Publishing Group intended to publish the book, appellee sued appellant in the
district [**5] court. (Although appellee named the author as a defendant, it
did not serve him with a summons and complaint, and he has never entered an
appearance.) Appellee claimed that the book copied "substantial portions" of
certain of Hubbard's works in violation of its exclusive copyright rights under
17 U.S.C. § 106, and accused appellant of willful copyright infringement under
17 U.S.C. §§ 106 and 501. In particular, appellee argued that 121 passages of
the book were drawn from 48 of Hubbard's works. The complaint sought, among
other things, an injunction to stop publication of the book. Appellee
subsequently moved for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary
injunction; by stipulation, the proceedings for a permanent and for a
preliminary injunction were later merged.
The district court granted a permanent injunction. It held, first, that the
copyright had expired on one of the works quoted in the book, the HCO Manual of
Justice. 729 F. Supp. at 995. The court then went on to determine whether the
book's use of passages from Hubbard's other works was protected "fair use" under
17 U.S.C. § 107, [**6] which is reproduced in the margin. n2 Id. at 995-1001.
The district court analyzed the four factors spelled out in § 107, and found
that factor one (purpose and character of the use) "strongly" favored appellee,
because [*155] "many of the passages lack any allowable fair use purpose," id.
at 998; factor two (nature of the copyrighted work) favored appellee since "so
many" of the quoted passages "are expressive rather than factual," id. at 999;
factor three (amount used in relation to copyrighted work as a whole) also
favored appellee, because the quoted passages amount to a "small, but
significant element of" the book, id. at 1000; and that factor four (effect of
use on the market for the copyrighted work) did not favor either party. Id. at
1001. The district court thus concluded that appellee was entitled to a
permanent injunction against publication of the book in its present form, noting
that "the book is still in manuscript form, so deletion of the infringing
passages will be relatively simple and inexpensive." Id. at 1001. The district
court thereafter entered judgment, listing 103 [**7] infringing passages taken
from 43 works, all published.
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n2 Section 107 provides that:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted
work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any
other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining
whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors
to be considered shall include --
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.
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Appellant now appeals from the judgment granting an injunction, and appellee
cross-appeals from the district court's determination that the copyright on the
HCO Manual had expired.
Discussion
1. Fair Use
Appellant asserts that, contrary to the district court's view, all four fair
use factors referred to in § 107 weigh in its favor, while appellee argues to
the contrary. At the outset, we note that § 107 "requires a case-by-case
determination whether a particular use is fair." Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.
v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 549, 85 L. Ed. 2d 588, 105 S. Ct. 2218
(1985). Furthermore, fair use is a mixed question of law and fact, id. at 560,
and thus the district court's conclusion on this point is open to full review on
appeal. See Puma Indus. Consulting, Inc. v. Daal Assocs., Inc., 808 F.2d 982,
986 (2d Cir. 1987). And, "where the district court has found facts sufficient to
evaluate each of the statutory factors, [**9] an appellate court 'need not
remand for further factfinding,'" but may resolve the issue of fair use as a
matter of law. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560 (quoting Pacific & Southern Co. v.
Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1495 n. 8 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1004,
85 L. Ed. 2d 161, 105 S. Ct. 1867 (1985)).
In addition, the structure of § 107 is significant. The section is entitled
"Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair use," and the opening sentence makes
clear that a "fair use . . . is not an infringement of copyright." The same
sentence furnishes examples of broad categories of fair use: "criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching. . ., scholarship or research." The section
then defines four non-exclusive factors to be considered in determining whether
a particular use is fair.
We have quite recently applied the doctrine of fair use in two opinions of
this court. See Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 890, 98 L. Ed. 2d 177, 108 S. Ct. 213 (1987); New Era
Publications Int'l, ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir.), petition
[**10] for reh'g denied, 884 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1094, 110 S. Ct. 1168, 107 L. Ed. 2d 1071 (1990). Since the decisions in
Salinger and New Era, there have been a number of articles on the subject of
fair use. See, e.g., Weinreb, Fair's Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine,
103 Harv.L.Rev. 1137 (1990). Indeed, several of the articles have been written
by some of the judges involved in those decisions. See Oakes, Copyrights and
Copyremedies: Unfair Use and Injunctions, to be published in a forthcoming
edition of the Hofstra L. Rev.; Leval, Commentary: Toward a Fair Use Standard,
103 Harv.L.Rev. 1105 (1990); Miner, Exploiting Stolen Text: Fair Use or Foul
Play?, 37 J. Copyright Soc'y 1 (1989); Newman, Not the End of History: The
Second Circuit Struggles with Fair Use, 37 J. Copyright Soc'y 12 (1989). Some of
these articles are highly critical of the state of the law with respect to the
fair use doctrine and offer suggestions for improvement. But, our task is to
apply as best we can the teachings of the governing precedents as we understand
them. In doing so, on the facts before us and under the [*156] [**11]
appropriate wide-ranging standard of review, we conclude that all four factors
listed in § 107 favor appellant, and that appellant's use was fair.
A. Factor One: Purpose and Character of the Use
As noted above, the book is an unfavorable biography. Section 107 provides
that use of copyrighted materials for "purposes such as criticism, . . .
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright." Our cases
establish that biographies in general, and critical biographies in particular,
fit "comfortably within" these statutory categories "of uses illustrative of
uses that can be fair." Salinger, 811 F.2d at 96; see also New Era, 873 F.2d at
583.
Citing Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 561, appellee argues that there is no rule
that if an allegedly infringing work is a biography, factor one necessarily
operates in the biographer's favor in evaluating whether there has been a "fair
use." Nevertheless, "if a book falls into one of these categories [i.e.,
criticism, scholarship or research], assessment of the first fair use factor
should be at an end." New Era, 884 F.2d at 661 (Miner, J., concurring in the
denial [**12] of rehearing in banc). True, the Supreme Court in Harper & Row
did not end its analysis of factor one once it had determined that the allegedly
infringing use (news reporting) was listed in § 107 as an example of fair use.
See 471 U.S. at 561-63. However, what the Court went on to consider was the
infringer's knowing exploitation of the copyrighted material-- obtained in an
underhanded manner -- for an undeserved economic profit. See id. at 562-63. The
present case, by contrast, does not involve "an attempt to rush to the market
just ahead of the copyright holder's imminent publication, as occurred in Harper
& Row." Salinger, 811 F.2d at 96. Instead, as the author explained in detail in
an affidavit submitted below, discussing the reason why he included each quote,
the author uses Hubbard's works for the entirely legitimate purpose of making
his point that Hubbard was a charlatan and the Church a dangerous cult. To be
sure, the author and appellant want to make a profit in publishing the book. But
the author's use of material "to enrich" his biography is protected fair use,
"notwithstanding that he and his publisher anticipate profits. [**13] " Id.
Appellee also contends that the book's use of Hubbard's works does not serve
any fair use purpose, but was rather unnecessary appropriation of Hubbard's
literary expression. We do not agree with this characterization. The author uses
the quotations in part to convey the facts contained therein, and not for their
expression. More importantly, even passages used for their expression are
intended to convey the author's perception of Hubbard's hypocrisy and pomposity,
qualities that may best (or only) be revealed through direct quotation. The book
"is not merely the product of 'the facile use of the scissors.'" Maxtone-Graham
v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1260 (2d Cir. 1986) (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9
F.Cas. 342, 345 (C.C.D.Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (Story, J.)), cert. denied, 481
U.S. 1059, 107 S. Ct. 2201, 95 L. Ed. 2d 856 (1987). Appellee points
particularly to the 17 topic quotations that begin many of the chapters; while a
few of these may arguably come close to the line separating critical study from
appropriation, most do not. Indeed, even this borderline use appears to serve
the author's purpose by juxtaposing the grandiose [**14] expression of the
quotations with the banal (to the author) material contained in the body of the
chapter. Moreover, the topic quotations sometimes serve to explain or to
summarize matters discussed in the chapter.
Appellee further argues that New Era explicitly held that copying for
purposes of demonstrating character defects cannot amount to fair use. This is
simply a misreading of New Era. The passage that appellee cites in support of
its interpretation, 873 F.2d at 583, does not reject the idea that quotation in
a biography to demonstrate character flaws may be fair use. Rather, the passage
rejects the claim that the purpose of the use entitles it to "special [*157]
consideration." Id.; see also New Era, 884 F.2d at 660-61 (Miner, J., concurring
in the denial of rehearing in banc). The panel in New Era, however, observed
that "as long as a book can be classified as a work of criticism, scholarship or
research, as can the book here, the factor cuts in favor of the book's
publisher, whether the copyrighted matter is taken from a literary lion like J.
D. Salinger or a purported prophet like L. Ron Hubbard." New Era, 873 F.2d at
583. [**15]
We hold that factor one favors appellant.
B. Factor Two: Nature of the Copyrighted Work
The district court found that all of the works from which the author quoted
had been published. 729 F. Supp. at 998. Whether or not a work is published is
critical to its nature under factor two, because "the scope of fair use is
narrower with respect to unpublished works." Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564; see
also New Era, 873 F.2d at 583; Salinger, 811 F.2d at 96. Thus, "even substantial
quotations might qualify as fair use in a review of a published work." Harper &
Row, 471 U.S. at 564.
Furthermore, the scope of fair use is greater with respect to factual than
non-factual works. See id. at 563. While there is no bright-line test for
distinguishing between these two categories, we have referred to the former as
works that are "essentially factual in nature," Maxtone-Graham, 803 F.2d at
1263, or "primarily informational rather than creative." Consumers Union of
United States, Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1049 (2d Cir. 1983),
[**16] cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823, 83 L. Ed. 2d 45, 105 S. Ct. 100 (1984). We
have some hesitation in trying to characterize Hubbard's diverse body of
writings as solely "factual" or "non-factual," but on balance, we believe that
the quoted works -- which deal with Hubbard's life, his views on religion, human
relations, the Church, etc. -- are more properly viewed as factual or
informational.
Appellee emphasizes, however, that there is no per se rule under Harper &
Row, New Era and Salinger that factor two favors an alleged infringer whenever
the works quoted from are published, as appellant appears to suggest. Appellee
is, of course, correct that there is no rule that one may copy with absolute
impunity from a published work, regardless of the amount taken. Otherwise, the
copyright law would be a nullity. Nevertheless, Hubbard's works have been
published, and "biographies, of course, are fundamentally personal histories and
it is both reasonable and customary for biographers to refer to and utilize
earlier works dealing with the subject of the work and occasionally to quote
directly from such works." Maxtone-Graham, 803 F.2d at 1263 (quoting Rosemont
Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966),
[**17] cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009, 17 L. Ed. 2d 546, 87 S. Ct. 714 (1967)).
Appellee also contends that Harper & Row did not endorse greater copying from
published works, arguing that in Salinger, we interpreted Harper & Row to mean
only that the likelihood "that copying will be found to be a fair use is
diminished when the copyrighted material is unpublished, not that a greater
quantity of copying of published works is permitted." Appellee fails to persuade
us, however, that the plain language of the Supreme Court in Harper & Row --
i.e., "even substantial quotations might qualify as fair use in a review of a
published work," 471 U.S. at 564 -- should be disregarded. Furthermore, even
assuming that appellee's characterization of Salinger's gloss on this passage is
correct, appellee advances no persuasive reason why a court should be less,
rather than more, likely to find fair use when, as here, the copyrighted
material has been published.
In addition, appellee argues that Harper & Row intended to allow liberal
quotation only for the purpose of literary criticism or review of published
works, and that the book does not purport to analyze [**18] the literary worth
of Hubbard's works. But, we regard appellee's attempt to limit Harper & Row to
literary criticism as entirely too literal-minded, particularly in the face of
[*158] our cases holding that biographies are considered works of criticism,
scholarship or research within the meaning of § 107. See, e.g., Salinger, 811
F.2d at 96.
Appellee further asserts that many of the quoted passages are more creative
or expressive than factual, and that Maxtone-Graham is not relevant here because
that case involved "standard social science source materials"-- i.e., quotations
drawn from published interviews. We agree, as already indicated, that there is
no easy distinction between works that are "factual" on the one hand, and
"creative" or "expressive" on the other, because "'creation of a nonfiction
work, even a compilation of pure fact, entails originality.'" Maxtone-Graham,
803 F.2d at 1262-63 (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 547). Thus, reasonable
people can disagree over how to classify Hubbard's works. Nevertheless, although
some of the quoted passages can accurately be described as expressive -- e.g.,
Hubbard's [**19] poetry -- our review of the record persuades us that most
simply cannot be so characterized.
Finally, appellee distinguishes Maxtone-Graham, rightly noting that the case
involved quotations from "a collection of verbatim interviews," which the
district court there described as "'essentially reportorial in nature.'"
Maxtone-Graham, 803 F.2d 1253, 1262. Nevertheless, we see nothing in that case
indicating that the panel intended its discussion of factor two to be limited to
situations involving such interviews. Indeed, the panel drew its discussion of
factor two from an earlier case dealing with biographies, Rosemont Enterprises,
Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 1009, 17 L. Ed. 2d 546, 87 S. Ct. 714 (1967).
We conclude that factor two favors appellant.
C. Factor Three: Volume of Quotation
Factor three addresses the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work, not to the allegedly infringing work. Harper
& Row, 471 U.S. at 564-65. "There [**20] are no absolute rules as to how much
of a copyrighted work may be copied and still be considered a fair use."
Maxtone-Graham, 803 F.2d at 1263. This factor has both a quantitative and a
qualitative component, so that courts have found that use was not fair where the
quoted material formed a substantial percentage of the copyrighted work, see,
e.g., Salinger, 811 F.2d at 98 (factor three favors copyright holder where
one-third of 17 letters and 10% of 42 letters used) or where the quoted material
was "'essentially the heart of'" the copyrighted work. Harper & Row, 471 U.S.
at 565 (quoting the district court opinion in that case, 557 F. Supp. 1067, 1072
(S.D.N.Y. 1983)).
Here, the book uses overall a small percentage of Hubbard's works. Appellant
calculates that the book quotes only a minuscule amount of 25 of the 48 works
that appellee claimed were infringed, 5-6% of 12 other works and 8% or more of
11 works, each of the 11 being only a few pages in length. (Appellee has
accepted these figures "for purposes of discussion," although it adds that they
may understate the true amount taken.) In the context of quotation [**21] from
published works, where a greater amount of copying is allowed, see Harper & Row,
471 U.S. at 564, this is not so much as to be unfair. Cf. Maxtone-Graham, 803
F.2d at 1263 (inclusion of 4.3% of published copyrighted work "is not
incompatible with a finding of fair use"); Iowa State Univ. Research Found.,
Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., 621 F.2d 57, 61-62 (2d Cir. 1980) (fair use
defense not available where broadcast was made containing 8% of a videotape that
apparently had never been broadcast before).
Nor is the use qualitatively unfair. Appellee asserts that "key portions" of
Hubbard's works are taken "in many cases." But the district court found that the
quotations in the book's text -- which amount to the bulk of the allegedly
infringing passages -- do not take essentially the heart of Hubbard's works. 729
F. Supp. at 1000. And our review of the remaining 17 passages, [*159] which
are "set off by themselves at the beginning of a part or chapter" and "set the
tone for the sections they precede," id. at 996, persuades us that they too do
not take essentially the heart of Hubbard's works. [**22]
Appellee also argues that factor three weighs in its favor because the
quotations are an important ingredient of the book, pointing out that 2.7% of
the book is made up of quotations from Hubbard's works. n3 Appellee asserts
that, because of the length of Hubbard's works and because so many of his
writings were quoted from, it would be of little value to focus on the amount of
infringing material in relation to the copyrighted works, and cites various
cases -- e.g., Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566; Salinger, 811 F.2d at 98-99;
Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1070-71 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1013, 54 L. Ed. 2d 756, 98 S. Ct. 727 (1978) -- in which courts discussed the
amount used in relation to the infringing work, not the infringed work.
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n3 Appellant puts the sum at 2.4% or 2.9%. The difference, however, is not
significant to our reasoning, and we will use appellee's figure for the purpose
of our discussion.
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We do not [**23] agree with appellee's argument. Section 107 plainly
commands us to consider "the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole" (emphasis added), and contains no
exception for lengthy works or quotations from multiple works. Furthermore, to
the extent that courts have looked to the infringing work, the use here is not
as significant as the use alleged in those cases. In Salinger, for example, the
quoted materials "to a large extent . . . [made] the book worth reading." 811
F.2d at 99; see also Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 565-66 (quotes constituted 13% of
the infringing work and played a "key role" in it); Meeropol, 560 F.2d at
1070-71 (quoted material figured prominently in the promotional work for the
book). By contrast, the use of the quotes here is primarily a means for
illustrating the alleged gap between the official version of Hubbard's life and
accomplishments, and what the author contends are the true facts. For that
purpose, some conjuring up of the copyrighted work is necessary. Cf. Cliffs
Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 497
(2d Cir. 1989) [**24] (trademark case; parody "must to some extent resemble the
original").
We find that factor three favors appellant.
D. Factor Four: Effect on the Market
Factor four of § 107 concerns the "effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work." According to the Supreme Court,
this "is undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use." Harper &
Row, 471 U.S. at 566 (footnote omitted). In evaluating this factor, courts do
not focus solely on the market for the work itself, but also on the "harm to the
market for derivative works." Id. at 568.
Appellee argues strenuously that factor four favors it, asserting that it
intends to publish an authorized biography of Hubbard that will include excerpts
from all of his works, including material as yet unpublished, and that the book
will discourage potential readers of the authorized biography by conveying the
flavor of Hubbard's writings. Appellee also contends that New Era leaves us no
choice but to rule in its favor on factor four; according to appellee, that case
held that publication of a similar unfavorable biography would impair the market
for, and compete with, [**25] its planned biography of Hubbard.
We do not find either argument persuasive. As to the first, we found it
"unthinkable" in Maxtone-Graham that potential customers for plaintiff's
copyrighted book containing a "series of sympathetic interviews on abortion and
adoption" would fail to purchase plaintiff's book because a small portion of it
was used in an essay sharply critical of abortion. 803 F.2d at 1264. Similarly,
we are skeptical here that potential customers for the authorized favorable
biography of Hubbard in the future [*160] will be deterred from buying because
the author's unfavorable biography quotes from Hubbard's works. Indeed, it is
not "beyond the realm of possibility that" the book "might stimulate further
interest" in the authorized biography. Id.
Furthermore, even assuming that the book discourages potential purchasers of
the authorized biography, this is not necessarily actionable under the copyright
laws. Such potential buyers might be put off because the book persuaded them (as
it clearly hopes to) that Hubbard was a charlatan, but the copyright laws do not
protect against that sort of injury. Harm to the market for a copyrighted [**26]
work or its derivatives caused by a "devastating critique" that "diminished
sales by convincing the public that the original work was of poor quality" is
not "within the scope of copyright protection." Consumers Union, 724 F.2d at
1051 (footnote omitted). This is so because the critique and the copyrighted
work serve "fundamentally different functions, by virtue" of, among other
things, "their opposing viewpoints." Maxtone-Graham, 803 F.2d at 1264. "Where
the copy does not compete in any way with the original," copyright's central
concern -- "that creation will be discouraged if demand can be undercut by
copiers" -- is absent. Consumers Union, 724 F.2d at 1051; see also 3 Nimmer on
Copyright, § 13.05[B], at 13-90.1 to -90.3 (1989). Here, the purpose of the book
is diametrically opposed to that of the authorized biography; the former seeks
to unmask Hubbard and the Church, while the latter presumably will be designed
to promote public interest in Hubbard and the Church. Thus, even if the book
ultimately harms sales of the authorized biography, this would not result from
unfair infringement forbidden by the copyright laws, but [**27] rather from a
convincing work that effectively criticizes Hubbard, the very type of work that
the Copyright Act was designed to protect and encourage.
Nor do we believe that New Era compels a contrary result. At the outset, we
note that the panel in New Era did not address in this context the point we have
just made, that is, a critical biography serves a different function than does
an authorized, favorable biography, and thus injury to the potential market for
the favorable biography by the publication of the unfavorable biography does not
affect application of factor four. See 873 F.2d at 583. Beyond that, however,
New Era involved the publication of previously unpublished material,
"particularly from [Hubbard's] early diaries and journals." Id. at 578-79.
Arguably, then, the unfavorable biography in New Era threatened economic harm to
the authorized biography, even though it fulfilled a different function, because
it contained material whose market value (1) had not yet been realized by the
copyright holder, and (2) might be entirely misappropriated by the infringing
publication. Here, by contrast, the works quoted from are all published, [**28]
and the book will not tap any sources of economic profit that would otherwise go
to the authorized biography. Cf. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562, 567-68
(unpublished work; actual damage of $ 12,500 shown, and infringing work intended
to scoop publication of copyrighted work); Salinger, 811 F.2d at 99 (unpublished
letters; infringing work "copies virtually all of the most interesting passages
of the letters").
We conclude that factor four favors appellant.
E. Other Factors
The factors enumerated in § 107 "are not meant to be exclusive," Harper & Row
, 471 U.S. at 560, and we have looked to such additional considerations as "bad
faith by the user of copyrighted material [that] suggests unfairness,"
Maxtone-Graham, 803 F.2d at 1264, or "prejudice suffered by [the alleged
infringer] as the result of [the copyright holder's] unreasonable and
inexcusable delay in bringing the action." New Era, 873 F.2d at 584. Although
appellee argues that the book's use of passages from Hubbard's works was
"predatory" rather than fair, we simply do not agree with this characterization,
and find that there [**29] are no additional factors suggesting unfairness.
In sum, balancing all of the relevant factors, we believe that the present
[*161] case presents a strong set of facts for invoking the fair use defense:
The book is a critical biography, designed to educate the public about Hubbard,
a public figure who sought public attention, albeit on his own terms; the book
quotes from merely a small portion of Hubbard's works and from only those that
have been published; and, it will cause no adverse impact protected by the
copyright law on the market for Hubbard's writings. In these circumstances, we
conclude that the book's use of passages from Hubbard's work is protected fair
use.
2. HCO Manual of Justice
On its cross-appeal, appellee argues that the district court erred in ruling
that the HCO Manual of Justice -- 18 passages from which are quoted in the book
-- had been published in 1959 and that its copyright had expired. Appellee
asserts that the HCO Manual was subject only to "limited" publication in 1959;
that the copyright notice appearing in the work -- "COPYRIGHT (C) 1959 by L. Ron
Hubbard All Rights Reserved" -- was incorrect and superfluous because the book
[**30] was not published; and that the book did not come under federal
copyright protection until January 1, 1978, the effective date of the 1976
Copyright Act.
We are not persuaded by these arguments, which, according to appellant, were
not raised below. The district court's finding that the HCO Manual was published
in 1959 is supported by evidence placed in the record by appellee itself, in
particular, an affidavit stating, among other things, that the HCO Manual was
published. Although appellant argues that this was a simple error caused by the
speedy nature of the proceedings below, this assertion cannot properly be raised
for the first time in this court.
Since the HCO Manual was published in 1959, there is no question that its
copyright expired in 1987. Under 17 U.S.C. § 304(a), any copyright that was in
its first term on January 1, 1978 "shall endure for twenty-eight years from the
date it was originally secured." The date that the copyright of the HCO Manual
was "originally secured" is governed by the provisions of the 1909 Copyright
Act. See 2 Nimmer [**31] on Copyright, § 7.02[C][1], at 7-13 to -14 (1989).
Under § 10 of the 1909 Act, an author "[secured] copyright for his work by
publication thereof with the notice of copyright," 1909 Act § 10, reprinted in
1990 supp. to 17 U.S.C.A., at 333, and § 19 of that Act specified that the
notice of copyright "shall include also the year in which the copyright was
secured by publication." Id. § 19, reprinted in 1990 supp. to 17 U.S.C.A., at
335. Here, the HCO Manual's copyright notice states 1959 as the copyright date;
thus, the HCO Manual's copyright lasted for 28 years from 1959, 17 U.S.C. § 304
(a), and expired in 1987.
Conclusion
We hold that each of the four factors of § 107 favors appellant, and that the
book's use of quotations from Hubbard's published works was protected fair use.
We also hold that the district court did not err in finding that the copyright
on the HCO Manual expired in 1987. We thus reverse the judgment of the district
court, except to the extent it concludes that the copyright on the HCO Manual
expired in 1987, as to which we affirm.